

**The following is the preface from Francois Laruelle's *Beyond the Power Principle* pp. 1-9 and is an original translation by Taylor Adkins 10/09/07.**

*Stylistic Caution*

A: But if *everyone* knew this *most* would be harmed by it. You yourself call these opinions dangerous for those exposed to danger, and yet you express them in public?

B: I write in such a way that neither the mob, nor the *populi*, nor the parties of any kind want to read me. Consequently these opinions of mine will never become public.

A: But how do you write, then?

B: Neither usefully nor pleasantly—to the trio I have named.

—Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, 71.

Flowing, multiple and simulated... Power is the only recent philosophical object which is becoming *interesting*: fictionalized, televised, cinematized, moralized, philosophized, psychoanalyzed... it tolerates all the treatments and survives them. So many transversals have made it acquire plasticity and the capacity for a synthesis which grounds the great fetishes: it joins together in its definition all the meanings and contrary uses, it concentrates in itself contradictory political and ideological ambitions. Like the older terms of Existence or Structure, but with more facility because it expresses fewer theoretical requirements (on this point, it has not been demonstrated until now as being very difficult, and on this point it is not the recent philosophy which will contradict us), it has conquered the grand capitalist style: as a concept, its practical value is virtually null, it is rather its exchange value, to which it is reduced, that makes its only possible usage.

Such a mutation in the history of philosophical concepts has precise material conditions. In particular it answers to a *change of market*. Any concept, through being bought and sold, must be escorted of its liking or by force to a market which is never single, which is always made of a principal market and resale markets. But the characteristic of the concept of power—I speak only about its circulation, not of its real production—is that it could not acquire an existence, i.e. become a fundamental concept of philosophy itself, beyond philosophy, which had however spoken about it constantly without, however, ever clearly raising the question of its sense, or, as certain philosophers say, the question of its “mode of being.” Let us not speak about a “change of terrain” for such a mutation, since it is no longer internal to philosophy, but has only happened essentially out of it. This will grant the change on the following fact: that the value of the concept of power is initially political and social, before being theoretical.

This fact is repugnant. But only by the excesses to which it gives place as do all grand new things; in particular by the affinity that everyone can apprehend between the same nature of power and its capacity to become what it is: a value rather than a concept, undoubtedly one of the rare philosophical objects able to tolerate at this point, and to perhaps appeal to, the methods that the ancient philosophical manner gave the name—close your eyes—of *marketing*, and that the new philosophical fashion, with an instinct of admirable surety, knew to make it necessary even to the existence of this object.

But, if this fact is repugnant, it should have nothing definitively graining about it, even for the most killjoy of thinkers. Let us suppose that philosophy, the grand provider of foundations, grounds and bases, ceases for a moment the real trade for which it is costumed and which through pretense agrees to be displaced. It will return sarabanding through the small door, mingling its voice with all those who speak about power, accepting the formation of a single chorus with the journalists and the novelists. All its art and its trickery will be made to turn around a little differently and to place well the wrong note which will suddenly reveal to the singers themselves how much, in the unanimous chorus of the schools, the living rooms, the newspapers, the media, everyone consciously sings falsely, drawn into their partition, relying on the virtues of the exchange to make of all these misunderstandings a pre-established harmony or a continuous miracle, and intending themselves to preserve it “make as if...” without which the capitalist market of philosophical values (and not only philosophical) could not function.

In this universal contraband where everyone speaks about power in general in so many various senses, but without believing in it less in the world, the “philosopher,” who at least will not be regarded as a miracle, but as a recipient, occupying a polemical and strategic position, raises only one question: who speaks about power? Who speaks “power,” i.e. the last of the universal languages?

Too often they are disappointed or conquered spirits: maybe by philosophy and its abstraction (journalists or various “intellectuals” seized by the mission of having to state the sense of history; “I am philosopher: see my extent of thought, my horizons, my insinuations”); maybe through real politics or what they imagine as such (philosophers exhausted by their own abstraction, envious of journalism, obsessed with its average techniques and slightly, why not, of its capacity “to be diffused”; “I am journalist: see my sense of the concrete”). One imagines the pact that these two categories will conclude for a common revenge against “theory,” an alliance that all the half-paid debts of theory and of practice—I want to say the “intellectuals”—can contract and upon which they fixate as in an objective confusion, skillfully maintained, between the traditional philosophical mastery, that which is necessary to cut down in effect, and what a certain silliness, always too modest, denounces as “speculation.”

It may be that spite and the spirit of revenge are bad advisers to reach an object such as power. The thesis of this book is that one does not know what one speaks when one thinks power starting from a scale: the Large or the Small, or of their mixture, when one evokes it as the unlimited reason of our misfortunes, or as the infinitely small element of our constraint and our hopes. Political reflection generally oscillates between two extreme poles that one proposes to avoid: the “power-comedy”, i.e. seen from the side of those who lose it and take it again with the liking of the Prince, the People or the Surveys, the small power for unused ministers. But what makes us nourish this trace: doesn’t any “microphysical” or “molecular” model of power continue to reflect, raise, and give theoretical form to this prejudice of the conception and the politicizing practice, the pettiness, the infinitesimal character of power? Doesn’t it risk, in spite of it all, simply to reverse the scale of the traditional political objects which were either too generic (political philosophy “middle-class”), or too specific (Marxism)? Isn’t it forced sometimes to practice the contrary design, sometimes to oppose itself violently to it (a symptom that hardly misleads), to be made in both cases the accomplice of the other idea of power: the “power-tragedy”, i.e. seen from the side of those who believe to suffer from it (those who really suffer from it do not make of it a tragedy), who represent it and set it up in a universal Despot, as the eternal metamorphosis (if one can say) of Leviathan or Medusa-the Grand Power for philosopher deputies, paid-off advisers to the Marxist tyrant or advisers in place of the Freudian tyrant (they are sometimes the same ones)?

Everything here is to make understood that power returns neither in the category of the Large which controlled traditional political philosophy; nor in that of the Small, the new myth into which modern thought was thrown with a suspect precipitation and which is only the renewal, in other forms, of the same error of optics, *which consists in wanting to subject power to an optics or a representation, i.e. to a prospect "from the bottom to the top."*

Power is a fluent matter, continuous, unlimited, i.e. also infinitely divisible. If it thwarts all the forms of representation and even the scales of size, it is because it is in affinity with an order which does not result from the mixture (dialectical or not) of Large and Small, but which explains the possibility of these mixtures. This order, it should well be named—here, will be called the “fractional” or the “machinic.” It has a certain characteristic to impose an unfolding, a lengthwise cleavage, a duplicity rather than a duality, between power (fractional also) and its essence, i.e. the internal condition of its production and its “deterioration”. Hence the division of power between its Principle and the Beyond of this principle. This is the Beyond that explains at the same time the need for the existence and the coercive character of all powers, and the need for their “decline.”

This book introduces thus with “political Materialism,” i.e. with the fundamental concepts of a discipline of power and bodies politic. It formulates in these problems the recent or traditional concepts of political struggle (Dissidence; Resistance; Class struggle; Masses, Classes, and Party). This is done only to withdraw them from their medium of origin and to think them from the point of the Beyond of power, therefore within a non-Marxist framework.

And as it starts with the question of the *sense of power*, it operates a turning (*Kehre*) towards that of the *power of sense*, i.e. the whole of technologies which the Occident has always understood without the name of “interpretation.” It thus presents the broad outlines of a re-evaluated “hermeneutics,” completely distinct from the old: politically minor or minority; materialist in its processes and its “operations;” and bearing on the modes of the political existence of the subject. This project is perhaps a challenge, if one knows what the old hermeneutics was. However, under this name of “minor,” one will not understand a new theoretical form of hermeneutics, but a certain power of interpretation, its techniques, its objects, its rules, its effects, which exert themselves on the whole surface of cultural and social experience, in the fortune telling of politics as well as the class struggle in psychoanalysis. As there is a power to punish or a power to work, there is a power to interpret of which description and criticism require means very distant from those of a Marxism insensitive to its grain, and which entangles, in a fabric of tightened mesh, the sense of power and the power of sense.

Being given this duplicity of power, there are only two possible methods, that which starts from power, and that which starts from its essence or “beyond.” The first is an interminable description of its plays, its strategies, and the historical forms of its techniques, with the manner of what it would be necessary to call an “archeology of power.” Toilsome, laborious, indispensable method. But in addition to this it deposits positive description into the positivist conception of power, and also deposits this movement towards its “microphysical” conception and finishes too often—less from the theoretical plane—by simply being opposed to the traditional and Marxist concept. Thus, what could seem as a deviation, is actually a double *normalization* of power: by the primacy from the “positive” point of view and “historicizing” fact over its criticism or its declines; by the primacy following from the microphysical scale over the fractional essence of power; in both cases by the primacy of the “Principle of power” over its “Beyond.”

The other method reverses—and makes more than a reversal—this primacy in that “Beyond” of the principle of power over power itself. It does not exclude “description” by any means, even in modifying the concept of it and making a more critical usage of it. But before being an “archeology,” which tolerates certain Marxist references as constituent (for example with the techno-economic apparatus of production), it is a “political Materialism” which differently poses and solves the problems of “historical Materialism.” It goes from the essence of power to the power. For it, the most urgent task is to put an end to higher, by producing *internal genetic definitions* of its objects (classes, revolution, technopolitics, resistance, subject, etc). It is thus not positivist, but materialist; it does not describe power from its previous history or presents, it thinks it from its future and its decline: the “revolution” also, and “thought” as well. To take again a sufficient Nietzschean distinction, the first method “interprets” the Relations of power, the second “evaluates” them; the first is basically descriptive, the second is “legislative” and leads to a minority ethics of struggle, “political” or not.

One will thus find here none of those historicizing, picturesque descriptions which give the modern reader so easily the feeling that he or she thinks, and which are being so well adapted with their hertzian and cathodic transmission... Rather the outline of a materialist critique of political reason. There are so many of these mixtures of philosophy and social sciences, philosophy and the history of institutions, so many, as of now, mixtures of philosophy and morals, that it has appeared useless for us to add to the encumbrance and variegation of the market of culture. One is satisfied to proceed with an immanent description, genealogical and critical, of power, by the means of a method which it would be necessary to call a materialist eidetic, and for the severity of which one would be slightly tempted to excuse oneself. As for the “abstract” character—thus it is said—of this text, it would have to be understood also—but that is an ideal which one does not pretend to reach—with the sense in which one speaks in mathematics about “abstract theory.” Because here the “abstraction,” if it can be possibly felt like a defect, is initially a positive character intrinsic to the theory of power, whose purity could only be darkened by “examples.” To tell the truth an example does not exist any more than a dream: let one show me an example of an example, and I will disavow this book. All the concepts worked out and produced in this text are at most designs to make function, not in alleged “feats of power,” but for a new cutting, primarily mobile and critical, historical experience as the production of power. These designs, this general writing of power, if one holds to denounce their insufficiency, can be defined as virtual rather than as “abstract,” in the sense that they have existence only in their effects (of “theoretical” power) which they are likely to produce. One usually believes to be precise by referring a concept with empirically taken phenomena and without trying hard to construct the design of the concept, the syntax to some extent of the division of phenomena, without having defined its capacity to effectuate itself not *in*, but *as* the experience. This theoretical indetermination combined with “concrete” references is what allows for the flowering of contradictory discourses on power.

To take a point of reference which makes it possible to measure to what degree of forfeiture philosophical theory is fallen—in France and perhaps all of Europe—in that common and vulgarized discourse that has failed a little more than out of habit, if we recall the double tradition which shared in the production of philosophy at the end of the 17th century: on the one hand that of the popular essay, illustrated by the English, the alleged “French philosophers” of the 18th century, and some German professors—on the other hand another part of the “system” renovated under the impulse of Kant, and who, only after him, is identified by his virtues of analysis and theoretical construction, with a “science” or, more rigorously, to a “doctrine of science.” Such an opposition, which regained with this double manner the old tradition of exoteric and esoteric sayings, can no longer apply to us such as it is,

including its presupposed changes. In particular we no longer conceive in the same manner the sense of theory and its autonomy. But it makes it possible to measure the path traversed in the loss of the flavor of philosophical style (mainly in France, where the philosophers are obsessed with literature, history and politics and neglect, except some, the invention of a method to think, to give all their care to the “contents”) and how much structuralism, on this point, has constituted nothing but a feeble barrage against this decline and this vulgarization. If it is thought that a genre of writing like this one, however abstract and tight, would have likely been arranged among the books that Fichte, for example, indicated as “popular,” including some of his own among them, it will be estimated that the “intellectuals” (France always had far too many “intellectuals” and not enough inventors of methods) should not delude themselves too much about their capacity of being nothing other than agitators of ideas.

It would have been necessary to be able to show—it is not the place here—that philosophy cannot find a *new* form of autonomy (it is certainly not the only one...), of new critical and revolutionary resources, unless it can conceive its relations with other disciplines, more generally the relations of the abstract and concrete, of thought and reality, to take again these slightly ineffective terms, such as a *continuous transition*, a *continuous passage*, *topologically without tear*, of one of these opposites to the other. Supposing that philosophy still has a future, it will conduct itself against the period which has consummated itself, characterized by its vicious mixtures of opposites, mixtures for example, of philosophy with the social sciences, linguistics and psychoanalysis, with history and literature. But also against the period which started from a supplementary baseness: mixtures of philosophy with the moral essay, the biography, journalism. If philosophy cannot occur, not only from raw material, but from external models of intelligibility, if it cannot form mixtures with them, on the one hand it may find it beneficial to attend to the exact sciences rather than the journalistic-fashion mongers who were recently illustrated in the commercial circulation of philosophy; and in addition it will preserve its rigor and its critical power only if it can cut sharply into its own flesh and make pass a pitiless line of demarcation through these necessary mixtures, i.e. between itself and itself: a thought without cruelty is a guard dog.

Because of all our efforts to destroy the traditional philosophical mastery, far from reaching *also* the humanities, literature, etc., philosophy has contributed *also* indirectly to deliver philosophy in order to worsen it, since they exceeded their goal thus by producing impossible effects for this mastery, it is perhaps time to assert with much prudence the dignity of the thinking thought, and again a certain autonomy of the philosophical discourse, established on new bases, integrating the maximum of the means by which we “arrange” in order to limit the return of this mastery, while preventing the resentment of the disciplines traditionally ousted by the great philosophical style and which currently try to build their revenge.

All our hopes, which go against this time, rest on the invention of a new Form of theoretical order, and not only theoretical. The current collapse (provisional besides) of Marxist theory, but also of all who had believed, in psychoanalysis or elsewhere, power to bind their fate to the structural form of order, is not at all the collapse of “the” theory. The “theory” is less surpassed than those who believe to have surpassed it. Because they had raised the theoretical ideal too high, they shout at the end of the world when their theoretical small world crumbles. The philosophical field was always partially occupied with guides and amateurs, now invaded here saboteurs and the nostalgic ones of the past who have known to elevate their vacuity of thought, their resentment, their lack of theoretical technology, to the height of a vision of the world and soon, perhaps, of an international market of philosophy.

Thus, we will not avoid the appearance here—but appearances are quite real in their own way—of a “reaction” against the economic situation. Like what Nietzsche says of art, the economic situation forces us to say to philosophy: there are necessary reactions, recurrences which are progress. Philosophy must be a necessary reaction against this time, in the name of the future and to keep it unnamed.

The following are six selections or definitions from Francois Laruelle's *Dictionnaire de la non-philosophy*. Pars: Editions Kimé, 1998. Original Translation by Taylor Adkins 10/24/07.

## **Transcendental Axiomatic**

***The nature and procedure of formation of the primary terms of non-philosophy, of its non-conceptual symbols, starting from philosophical concepts concerned with philosophical intuitiveness and naïveté.***

Axiomatics is initially a scientific object. It is the organization of a theory or a fragment of a theory in order to empty the terms of their empirical or regional contents, and to reveal explicitly the logical apparatus which connects them between them and becomes through this their only contents. There is a philosophical reflection on the axiomatic (Aristotle) but few examples of axiomatization in philosophy itself, if it is not perhaps in Descartes' Responses to the second objections, Spinoza's *Ethics* and the WL1794 of Fichte. In all these cases it is about an ontological axiomatization, still largely intuitive. In the sciences, more or less complete attempts at axiomatization were made in particular by Hilbert in geometry, by Jean-Louis Destouches in quantum physics—i.e. above all in fields where unexpected innovations (non-Euclidean geometries: Heisenberg's 'uncertainty' principle) required theoretical reorganization to legitimate their rigor. The epistemology of Mario Bunge draws conclusions from the postulate that it is in theory possible to axiomatize any scientific discipline. But axiomatization is an effort of reorganization which comes with the aftermath—even after a crisis—in the goal to examine the validity of a theory and the formalization of its relations to other theories and which, in any event, has known limits (Godel). It is more a theoretical instrument than a theoretical project of the foundation of science.

In opposition to a formal axiomatic, applied to a body of scientific knowledge, and ontological and intellectualist axiomatic that is still intuitive (for example, I think, therefore I am of Descartes or I am—the World is, of Husserl), the pure transcendental axiomatic forms the terms or the primary names, the non-conceptual symbols, starting from the intuitive and naïve concepts of philosophy. It explicitly inscribes in the writing of these names the first suspension of their philosophical sense (e.g. One-without-being, living-without-life, given-without-donation, One-beyond-being, etc.), of its worldly and/or ontological intuitiveness. It gives them a radical, indivisible theoretical universality in "generality" and "totality"; and transcendental, or univocal, applying to any philosophy. This decision of nomination, non-philosophical decision itself, given-in-the-last-instance by the vision-in-One, is the primary transcendental act of the force (of) thought. This is to say that far from being subservient to a philosophical project of foundation, even of the auto-foundation of science, it is only a transcendental instrument given-in-the-last-instance by Reality, thought (thought according to the One) thus using science as much as philosophy.

It is no longer a question of a logico-formal, scientific axiomatization of philosophy—an absurd project that misunderstands its irreducibly transcendental style. Non-philosophy does not claim to reorganize the system of philosophy after its crisis. To axiomatize is its primary ordinary practice of philosophy, according to the "abstraction" or the being-separate-without-separation of the Reality-of-the-last-instance. Thought is condemned to resort to philosophy and its language while rendering it adequate to the non-philosophical essence of this thought, which wants to be with the measurement of Reality.

## **Generalized Fractality**

***One of the other possible names of the unilateral structure of non-philosophical representations. It attests to the practice of theoretical and experimental generalization—a radical uni-versalization—of a particular physico-geometrical theory: the fractals of Mandelbrot, from which it releases a fractal identity being able to call itself from philosophy and then constitute an `artificial philosophy`:***

The philosophico-spontaneous treatment of the Mandelbrotian concept of fractals—which is the quantification of the degree of irregularity and fragmentation of a physico-geometrical object—is revealed from a decisional gesture of philosophy in regard to the sciences. The mechanism of philosophical universalization, illegitimate or “delirious” (cf. Kant) but inevitable, of a local scientific theory, is the following: knowledges are isolated from their practico-experimental and auto-positional processes as transcendent “facts,” only in so much as they ideologically sustain the representation of Being. The result of this universalization, indispensable to the survival of philosophy, is a mixed, empirico-transcendental concept of fractality. That is to say scientific modeling (dimension D) is confused with reality or being: it is reality itself which “fractalizes itself” (Serres). Suppose that this is re-appropriated “schizo-analytically” to become a unitarily split representation of being: the “fractal” model describes “the smooth space” of the non-metric, nomadic multiplicities (Deleuze). It is then supposed that the thought of being or the being of thought acts under the pretext of the `reconciliation of science and philosophy`, of the claim of the `transcendental` right of philosophy over the sciences.

Generalized or uni-versalized fractality is a specific experimentation which gives up its destiny as the desire of philosophy to be science. Instead of being a simple analogical transfer of the scientific knowledge for the representation of Being, it is the experimental non-philosophical work of scientific concepts: 1) let this be such a particular scientific theory in its own legitimacy without intervening there as it wants to do philosophy 2) do not “apply” or do not generalize imprudently this particular theory for the benefit of philosophical authority. The universalization of fractality is rather a modeling, similar to the theoretico-experimental work of Mandelbrot, but under other conditions of experimentation—the universal of the vision-in-One—and with a broad object consequently “larger” than geometrico-physics, the philosophical object itself.

These conditions are those of first Science rather than philosophy: 1) the One or the condition of identity-of-the-last-instance replaces the internal principle of homogeneity or constancy in Mandelbrot; 2) the Unilateral as the very structure of thought according to-the-One replacing the condition of irregularity or fragmentation; 3) the object of fractalization, maintaining the natural language in its various philosophical, poetic, literary uses....replaces the geometrico-physical object. These conditions given, the fractalization of philosophy is possible, as a potential example of non-philosophical work, effectuated under the condition of the last-instance of the One and the force (of) thought. This work produces an opened ensemble, a universe of really universal fractal knowledges that `reflect` the One adequately. Such a practice is distinguished from the task of the wise-philosopher who, believed to hold the authority of transcendental approval, repeats the mixed epistemo-philosophical gesture of` expropriation and re-appropriation, instead of using the sciences themselves only under the conditions of a transcendental axiomatic.

## **Metascience**

***Ensemble of discourses of a philosophical type that finds its origin in the object of science, the elucidation and foundation of its essence, but which in their turn are treated as the object or the phenomena of first Science.***

This concept does not have a special use in philosophy since it, spontaneously, recognizes the right to legislate over science, and that it is thus by definition 'meta-science', sometimes the absolute science or science of sciences, sometimes the discourse of elucidation or commentary, interpretation, criticism, and foundation of the sciences.

Non-philosophy defines a precise content and statute of metascience. Content: the whole of the nonscientific discourses that aim at the essence of science; that is to say directly: epistemologies, philosophies-of-sciences and philosophies-to-science (which are based explicitly on a given empirical theory); that is to say indirectly, philosophy in general as it is implicitly determined by scientific ruptures. A statute: 'metascience' conjoins with 'science', and this generalized couple is that of 'mathematics' and 'metamathematics' posed by Hilbert in his theory of the demonstration of the absolute consistency of formal systems. This concept thus has sense only within and according to science and of its priority over metascience.

This generalization answers a precise objective:

1. To show the similarity between the programs of formal (Hilbert) and logical (Frege, Russell) foundation of arithmetic, and the programs of foundation of science in general which are implicitly all philosophies and explicitly the 'theories of science' (Aristotle; Fichte; philosophy as 'science of science in general'; Husserl: philosophy as rigorous science or 'science with absolute foundation', etc).
2. To make metascientific discourses a type of similar operation to that which Godel did to metamathematics: instead of supposing, without evidence other than philosophical faith, that philosophies are really able to found and anticipate sciences and that this objective has some sense that it is, reversing the situation and giving itself the means of a science of metascience or philosophy. It is 'first science', still known as 'non-philosophy' (or 'science of philosophy', but this is only one aspect of its activity). Philosophy corresponds indeed to the area of the phenomena of which this new or "unified" science uses in order to determine not the traditional "essence of the science", but the knowledge of the essence (of) science.
3. To show through this new discipline in the character of "unified theory" that if metascience aims at the essence of science, it aims at it in the illusion or repression, seeing the foreclosure, and that it is for these two reasons that philosophy functioned through materiality.

The concept of 'metascience' makes it possible to renew the parallel problem of 'metalanguage' and to draw a possible treatment of this question. First Science poses the following statements which are also applicable to metalanguage: 1. there is, in any event, metascience, that is to say a discourse which is posed or is presented in the form as such (resp. metalanguage); 2. The statements: 'there is no metascience' (...)', or; "there is a metascience, and it is valid", are excluded as an expression of the sufficiency of philosophy; in the same way, though to a lesser degree: "there are effects of metascience (...)", effects of a play of 'textual forces' or of a 'play of language' in the immanence through which metascience plunges. First Science is a transcendental science of metascience, it reintroduces it into the immanence-of-the-last-instance of the One-real; it is not a philosophy which would reintroduce it into the immanence of a (philosophical) decision.

## **Philosophical Decision**

***Principal and formalized invariant or structure of philosophy, according to philosophy which does not indicate it without however simultaneously auto-affecting and affecting its own identity; according to non-philosophy which gives it a radical identity this time (of) structure or which determines it in-the-last-instance. Its synonyms: dyad and unity, ambiguity, unity-of-opposites, mixture, mélange—are likely even to have a double use, intra-philosophical and non-philosophical, which change their sense. The philosophical Decision is a mixture of indecision and decision, never pure decision.***

1) The decision in the traditional rational sense is the act; determined by reasons of a structural nature, of the economic situation or individual (choice), by which the individual puts an end to a deliberation. The economist and specialist in artificial science, H.A. Simon, defines it: 'the process at the end of which one chooses at each time one of these alternatives. The series of decisions which determine behavior during a given amount of time can be called a strategy'.

2) The philosophical, variable Decision according to the philosophers, corresponds to a certain invariant, explicit or repressed distribution, of transcendental and empirical functions. Compared to an ensemble of facts known as 'empirical', or a 'technico-experimental' work, etc., the philosopher reactivates the decision of the question, which he considers fundamental, of the essence of phenomena. He makes a double distinction, that of the empirical and the a priori, whatever it is; then that of the a priori and the transcendental, which is an increase so that he calls it beginning, origin, substance, Being, etc, but which is always presumably authentic reality, equipped with transcendental functions (in a broad sense).

3) These concepts were obviously generalized and criticized in Deconstruction and the philosophies of Difference, by the interrelated concepts of play, effects and strategies. But the empirical, a priori, transcendental levels and reality are structural invariants and do not apply only to Kant and Husserl, with the provision of understanding them as invariants and not as entities or essences.

The philosophical Decision is an operation of transcendence which believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary discourse on Reality. This authoritative claim is expressed through autoposition, an operation made possible by its being mixed or ambiguous. The philosophical Decision thus has as a structure the coupling of the Unity of opposites and as a function to hallucinate the One-real and thus to foreclose. To philosophize is to decide Reality and the thoughts that result from this, i.e. to believe to be able to order them with the universal order of the Principle of Reason (Logos), but also more generally in accordance with the "total" or unitary order of the the Principle of sufficient philosophy. Hence the ambiguities that relate to Reality (as Being...) and to thought (as philosophy), and which are at the same time the element and the result of the auto-decisional process. This comprises various operations which are the fundamental moments of any philosophical Decision, and to which corresponds, under a non-auto-decisional form, the transcendental and a priori identity of the subject of non-philosophy, the force (of) thought. Broadly, the philosophical Decision, as the philosophical formalization of philosophy itself, is used as a symptomatic indication and occasion for the development of the force (of) thought which, in addition, has for its "correlate" the identity, the sense (of) identity of the philosophical Decision, which is to apply to a foreclosure of Reality or the One.

## **Philosophy**

***Object (occasion, material, symptom) of non-philosophy.***

When it tries to be thought rather than to be practiced spontaneously and naively, philosophy is for itself the object mid-speech, of a semi-definition, a set of speeches and silences. It is embarrassing to say “the” philosophy is the true philosophy. Philosophical systems are a fallen or menaced effort to say what they are, to dissimulate the impossibility of saying it, to avoid having to keep silent itself.

Philosophy is an a priori discourse on the one hand, with a systematic goal on the other hand. It poses the world of which being is preformed in the logos with a predicative structure. This predicative structure of philosophical discourse is organized in a speculative reflection, as the last absolute philosophy shows (Hegel). The essence of the speculative reflection is specularity, or the dyad. The suture of being and thinking forms, since Parmenides, the unsurpassable mirror stage of philosophy. Since Heidegger, certainly, the deconstructive philosophers try to break the mirror in substituting it with the specularity of Being and its residue dispersed or disseminated by the Other. However, this Other of the logos has efficacy only in an ultimate reference obligated to the logos that is presumably relevant for Reality. The philosophical Decision has become a forcing. Since Plato at least, it homogenizes, idealizes, quantifies and qualifies Reality and the foreclosed. To philosophize means to decide on a strategy of posing the world. It is not to know, but to form a priori decisional speech acts in an action of culture. Always (re)stated in a diversity of styles of writing, form-philosophy, following the example of myth and its primordial metaphors, expresses the repetition of itself and the inertia of its auto-reproduction. Nietzsche shows extremely well that philosophy is brought, to think itself, by thematizing the absolute and primordial metaphor of the Eternal Return of the Same. Form-philosophy is then a metaphorical discourse (supported by the logos, being, etc. and basically anointed by primordial Greece). In general and non-Nietzschean terms, philosophy is finally a priest, conveying to the Occident the sacred Greeks overdetermined by the holy Judeo-Christian.

Through its principal process—to transcend it as it overrides the transcendent—, it is a faith, with the sufficiency of faith, intended by necessity to remain empty but which necessarily evades this void by its repopulation with objects and foreign goals provided by experience, culture, history, language, etc. Through its style of communication and ‘knowing’ it is a rumor—the occidental rumor—which is transmitted by hearsay, imitation, specularity and repetition. Through its internal structure, or ‘philosophical Decision’, it is the articulation of a Dyad of contrasted terms and a divided Unity, immanent and transcendent to the Dyad; or the articulation of a universal market where the concepts are exchanged according to specific rules to each system, and from an authority with two sides: one of the philosophical division of work, the other of the appropriation of part of what the market of the concepts produces. The philosopher is thus the capital or a quasi-capital in the order of the thought. Or the shape of the World understood in its more inclusive sense.

The preceding descriptions of philosophy find their occasion in philosophical descriptions, but they actually already suppose the non-philosophical ground. If it is embarrassing to say that philosophy is the criterion of the philosopher, the transformation of this aporia into a problem and its solution is the criterion of the non-philosopher who substitutes, in connection with philosophy, i.e. its identity, knowledge of the sufficiency of its faith. He or she does it using radically unknown means of philosophy (vision-in-One as ‘presupposed reality’), or foreign to it (cloning and the determination-in-the-last-instance of the force (of) thought; the reduction of philosophy to the state of symptom and occasion). Non-philosophy breaks with auto-hetero-critical philosophy, typical of modernity and post-modernity. With its manner it develops philosophy by releasing it from its authority over itself and by releasing its identity or its sense for the force (of) thought, which is the authentic subject of (for) philosophy. It gives philosophy even a widened relevance by which it seems like the span or the dimension of the World, i.e.

like the identity (of) its Greek, cosmopolitan determination; like the thought-world that only the vision-in-One can take for an object.

## **Non-philosophy**

***Autonomous and specific discipline of an identically scientific and philosophical type, which describes in-the-last-instance according to the One-real and by means of philosophy and of science considered as material, on the one hand the force (of) thought or the existing-subject-Stranger, on the other hand the object of non-philosophy, the identity (of) the thought-world.***

Non-philosophy is regarded by philosophy either as the state of immediacy of naive and sensible opinions (the judgments of common sense), or as its other which it remains to think (sciences, technologies, politics, the arts...) that is to say as the presuppositions of philosophy itself (the innumerable "non-thoughts" [*impensés*]) which are in their turn philosophables. Merleau-Ponty's report, in connection with post-Hegelian thinkers (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx...) is very revealing when he wonders whether our century 'does not enter the age of nonphilosophy'. But the expression initially has a negative content, even depreciated, which can become positive like it has among contemporary thinkers of difference, such as Derrida (cf. *Positions*), and especially Deleuze (cf. *What Is Philosophy?*) who still synthesizes to the extreme this very 'negative' vagueness which is at bottom the thought of the Other, in writing: 'the philosopher must become non-philosopher, so that non-philosophy becomes the ground and the people of philosophy'.

Distinct from this becoming which intertwines Being and Difference, the vision-in-One (as immanent and manifest Real) is the transcendental 'wire' of a non-philosophical thought consisting and positively distinct from this non-philosophical current flowing in the recesses of philosophy.

Non-philosophy is an autonomous and specific discipline which has its own concepts (One-real, vision-in-One, first science, cloning...); its theoretical operations which are transcendental by their real or in-One cause (induction and deduction); its non-autopositional pragmatic rules; its philosophically undecidable objects such as; the One, Being [*l'Être*], the Other, Being [*l'Étant*] and which, non-philosophically transformed, gives: the One-real; the a priori structure of Representation; the philosophical as the Principle of resistance of the thought-world; the chaotic universe (of) multiple representations obtained by acting it from the One-cause over the philosophical material as forms of the World. Autonomy means the epistemic cut (foreclosed-being, determination-in-the-last-instance, unilaterality, the dual...) between the non-philosophical posture and the philosophical Decision. The specificity of non-philosophy wants to speak a practice (pragmatic and theoretical) strictly immanent for philosophy but also sciences, art..., with determined rules, as for example the rule of the chora, the suspense of philosophical Authority and the staging of philosophy's material.

Non-philosophy is initially a theory by or according to the One, therefore a unified theory of science and philosophy. It is over time a theoretical, practical and critical discourse, distinct from philosophy without being a meta-philosophy. It is specified according to the regional material inserted into the structure of the philosophical Decision (non-aesthetics, non-ethics, etc).

The following is an entry from Francois Laruelle's *Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie*. Paris: Editions Kimé, 1998. Original translation by Sid Littlefield, 10/31/07.

Vision-in-One (One, One-in-One, Real)

***Primary concept of non-philosophy, equal to "One-in-One" or the "Real". What determines the theory of in-the-last-instance and the pragmatics of the Thought-World ("philosophy"). The vision-in-one is radically immanent and universal; it is the given-without-giveness of the givenness of the Thought-World.***

Philosophy is the desire and oppression of the One, divisible or associated with division. The problemization of Being (Heidegger included) supposes this barred One without really thematizing it. Philosophies of the One (Plato, neo-Platonism, Lacan) suppose a final convertibility with Being based on the fact that Being is given a final objectivity, that is ordered by the criteria of Being or abstracted from them. All 'thoughts of the One' are still structured like that of metaphysics: They hold an ultimate bound between the metaphysics of the science of Being and the science of the One. The necessary disqualification of the One of the Greek from its empirical component, the one of the count or counting (Badiou), in an extreme point of conflict between Being and the One and the 'death' of this one. The philosophy that wishes to be post-metaphysical oscillates, in the best cases, between the end of Being and the end of the One, while not ceasing to honor metaphysics.

Non-philosophy enunciates a series of axioms on the One understood as vision-in-One and no longer as the desire of the One:

- (1) The One is radical immanence, identity-without-transcendence, not associated with transcendence or division.
- (2) The One is in-One or vision-in-One and not in-Being or in-Difference.
- (3) The One is the Real in so far as it forecloses all symbolization (thought, knowledge, etc.)
- (4) The One is the given-without-giveness and separation-without-separation—of the given.
- (5) The One is that which determines in-the-last-instance the Thought-World as given (the object of givenness).

Non-philosophy renounces the thought-of-the-One or the desire-of-the-One, but this renouncement has a higher purpose than the renouncement of desire: the One-in-One is the unknown of philosophy, that which is correctly foreclosed but, by confusing the transcendental One with the transcendent One, it believes is within its power to think, sometimes close to repression. Philosophy repels their proper 'One' but forecloses in a manner the being-foreclosed of the One-in-One. This confusion is the faith and sufficiency of the philosophy that starts by raising the vision-in-One. Non-philosophy is installed on a different terrain than philosophy or, better still, on "the absurd" that is the Real. Philosophy occurs upon a ground that it illusively takes as the Real but which is 'real' only for the experience, while non-philosophy takes its departure from the utopia of the Real. This is not a 'utopia' 'in the vulgar

philosophical sense, but a thought-according-to-utopia. Utopia determined in-the-last-instance of the thought that takes for its object the Thought-World. Rather than the interminable end of the metaphysical, it initiates its own identity, such that this identity of metaphysics invalidates or unilateralizes its sufficiency and its authority. With this substitution of the thought-according-to-the-One as the thought of the science of the One, the triumph or defeat of the One of the Greek, of the desire of the One, whether it is conveyed or spoiled by the Multiple (Deleuze/Badiou), is of little importance: the philosophical adventures of the One are property of the objects of non-philosophy as vision-in-One, and nothing more.

The vision-in-One 'gives' the One in the one and only way, it is a part in part of the given, the given as the identity of the given, as the given-without-giveness, unfolding or doublet of the given and of giveness. It is thus radical phenomenon, without the backwards phenomenological world in its vastest sense: without Being behind the phenomenon or related to it. But if it does not give the One and if it neither exceeds it nor is alien to it, it also gives the Thought-World but it still gives it in-One or in the form of the given-without-giveness. The giveness-of –the-given (Thought-World) is the object of a non-philosophical giveness by force (of) thought, this one itself given-without-giveness or given-in-the-last-instance. The vision-in-One is thus universal-in-immanence instead of universal by transcendence, extension, generality, etc. It is necessary to write uni-versal: with the sense of the One, while remaining in an immanence foreclosed as the Thought-World, receiving it without being effected by it, or offered and opened to it as an openness-without-horizon, from a completely immanent in-stasis [*instase*]. In a sense the One is 'for the World', understanding that 'for' does not signify any end, internally or externally, but is available through indifference (and not an indifference through abstraction as this abstraction is generally understood).