

Notes on Logic of Sense: Preface, Series 1 and 2, Appendix 1 on Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy

Logic of Sense: Preface

Here Deleuze begins by highlighting Carroll and the Stoics for their theory of events; he says that there is a marriage of language and the unconscious at work.

Paradoxes imply that sense is a nonexistent entity (xiii). Deleuze claims that the Stoics formed a new image of thought [how can this be linked to *Difference and Repetition* wherein Deleuze claims that it's imperative to move beyond a certain dogmatic image of thought? Ultimately, in the preface Deleuze claims that *Logic of Sense* will attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel (xiv).

Series 1: Paradoxes of Pure Becoming

Alice in Wonderland—simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction—but paradox is the affirmation of both sense or directions at the same time (1).

Plato—limited and measured things, fixed qualities vs. pure becoming without measure—becoming-mad. We can see this distinction in the *Philebus* where the becoming-mad introduces a certain rebelliousness into matter (thus subverting the identity of the concept).

There is a subterranean dualism—that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes it—the icon-copy as good image, the simulacrum as bad image.

Simulacrum eludes the action of the Idea and contests both model and copy; thus it is not enough to say that the simulacrum is a copy of the copy.

In Plato we find that this pure becoming might be a problem related to language (*Cratylus* and *Philebus*). There is a flow of speech that constitutes a wild discourse, incessantly sliding over its referent. Might then, as Deleuze suggests, there be two languages, and two sorts of names?

There are those names that designate pauses (substantives and adjectives/qualities) and those that are essentially movement (the infinitive). One is always concealing or enveloping the other dimension (2). There is also a paradox of infinite identity ($D+R$ on the infinity of representation, plus Appendix 1). Language fixes the limits but also transcends these limits (2-3).

Sense moves in both directions at once—there is a reversal of the active and passive—all these reversals contest Alice's identity and her proper name (3). Name is guaranteed by the permanence of *savoir*. (Here we see not only an affinity with Badiou's theory of knowledge but also we come into contact with one of Deleuze's own conceptual pairing of knowledge and learning in *Difference and Repetition*). When these names dissolve, the substantives and adjectives that envelop personal identity slide into the language of events and the verbs of pure becoming (3). All identity disappears from the world, self, and

God. Everything happens as though events enjoyed an irreality (or as Deleuze will expound more later, a virtuality).

Personal uncertainty is an objective structure of the event itself, insofar as it moves in two directions at once, and insofar as it fragments the subject following this double direction (3). Paradox destroys good and common sense (link this to the notion of para-sense in *Difference and Repetition*—also pg. 300 in *Difference and Repetition* on a good summary of the interaction of series).

2. Paradoxes of Surface Effects

Stoics contend that bodies are: tension, physical qualities, actions and passions, and ‘states of affairs’ (Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* will be key to some of the passages in *LoS*). These are determined by the mixtures of bodies (4). At the limit there is a unity of all bodies in a primordial Fire. The only time of bodies and states of affairs is the present. The living present accompanies the act. Cosmic present—immobile sections.

All bodies are causes—this unifying, cosmic tendency is called Destiny.

All bodies are causes in relation to each other and causes for each other—their effects, however, are ‘incorporeal’ entities. They are logical or dialectical attributes, as opposed to physical qualities. They are not things or facts but events (Can Wittgenstein think the event?). They subsist with a minimum of being. They are verbs—the results of actions and passion—impassive results. They are not living presents but infinitives—the unlimited Aion.

There are two times—one for bodies and one for incorporeal events (5).

Only the present *exists* in time, but the past and the future *subsist* in time and divide each present infinitely (thus there is an actualization of the present but a virtual memory of the past and future as a whole, etc.).

Brehier and the Stoics—real and profound being is force; the plane of facts on the surface (5).

Mixtures and qualitative states of affairs constitute depths; incorporeal events arise at the surface as a result.

Deleuze claims that the Stoics displace all reflection: the genius of a philosophy must be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts (6).

Cleavage of the causal relation—declension of causes and conjugation of effects. There is a causality without destiny (6).

The extra-being and quasi-cause of the effect (7). Highest term is not Being but Something (Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics*). The Stoics are the first to reverse Platonism (although Deleuze will also say that Plato points to this reversal in the *Sophist*).

The Idea is impassive—it constitutes itself through an extra-being on the surface—the ideational is nothing more than an effect (7).

Everything now returns to the surface: the unlimited returns—Becoming-mad rises to the surface.

The surface now represents all possible ideality. Simulacra cease to be subterranean rebels and constitute phantasms on the surface.

The impassive event allows the active—passive to be interchanged more easily (8).

Events envelop quasi-causes in their relations.

Stoics use paradox as an instrument for the analysis of language and as a means of synthesizing events. Dialectics is the science of incorporeal events as they are expressed in propositions and of the connections between events as they are expressed in relation between propositions (8).

(Remember the dialectic as discussed in *D+R*, Plato (*Philebus*) and in Hegel.

Dialectics is the art of conjugation (or confatalia of the series of events).

Paradox is a sorites—series of interrogative propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive additions and retrenchments (8). Chrysippus and nonsense: chariots.

Paradox appears as a dismissal of depths—Humor is the art of surfaces—Irony of depths/heights.

With the Stoics, humor found its dialectic (9).

Carroll and the Stoics: events, things, states of affairs.

Events are like crystals and grow on the edges (9).

Alice's move from the depths to the surface—follow the border, there is an ethic of surfaces (9-10).

Only little girls understand Stoicism, or a stuttering, left-handed boy (10).

Continuity between reverse and right sides—surface effects communicate in one and the same Event (11).

Appendix 1: Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy

Reverse or reversal of Platonism? Abolish essence/appearance duality (253).

Motive of a Theory of Ideas must be to select and choose—Platonism—method of division, the dialectic of genres and species (254).

The purpose of Platonic divisions is to select lineages and to distinguish from the impure; this is a dialectic of rivalry (254). There must be a way to screen for claimants (*Difference and Repetition* and the ground of Justice p. 9?).

An elective participation is the response to the problem of a method of selection. Unparticipated, participated, participant—justice.

Myths construct the immanent model or foundation-test. The Sophist is the being of the simulacrum (256).

Plato points the direction for the reversal of Platonism by an analysis of the simulacrum in the sophist. Copies are secondary possessors, but simulacra are like false claimants (256).

Copies—icons vs. simulacra—phantasms (256)

Plato must distinguish well-founded copies from simulacra (257).

Icons are good images endowed with resemblance—this is due to an internal relation to the idea (Poincaré).

Internal and spiritual, resemblance is the measure of any pretension—Simulacra have an unfounded pretension and elude the action of the idea—Derrida, writing as false suitor (footnote 2) (257).

Simulacra are not copies of copies, they are different in kind—simulacra are images w/o resemblance (257).

Simulacra internalize dissimilarity—they are based on the model of the Other ($D+R$ —the Other-structure).

Good copy = right opinion/ bad copy = the knack (technique without rationality).

Simulacra offer huge depths, dimensions and distances that the observer cannot master [mastery, sublimity of the sense] (258).

Simulacra include a differential point of view that subsumes the observer—always more and less at once but never equal (258). How to tame the becomings with icons? Platonism founds the domain of representation ($D+R$ and the 4 chains of representation).

Abstract determination of the foundation as that which possesses in a primary way (259).

Plato→Aristotle→Christianity (categories to infinite)—Hegel + Leibniz—infinately large and small. Leibniz and compossibility (259-260) Convergence and exclusive disjunctions. Monocentric Hegelian dialectics.

Iconology and selection→exhaustion of pretenders (260).

Aesthetics as duality—theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience and theory of art as reflection on real experience (260).

Work of art as experimentation—more than one story told at once—divergent stories (metalepsis) (260).

Internal resonance of basic series → induces a forced movement which goes beyond the series (261).

This is the simulacra that affirms its repressed power (261).

Conditions of real experience and the structure of the work of art are reunited (261).

–Divergence of series

–Decentering of circles

–Constitution of the chaos which envelops them

–Internal resonance

–Movement of amplitude

–Aggression of the simulacra

These systems put disparate elements or heterogeneous series in communication (261).

Signal-sign systems—signal is a structure in which differences of potential are distributed assuring the communication of disparate components—the sign flashes across the boundary of two levels, between two communicating series. All phenomena respond to these conditions inasmuch as they find their dissymmetry. In order to speak of simulacra, we have to highlight inclusive differences and internalized series.

2 ways of thinking difference—world as icon/world as phantasm. Constitutive disparity and the unity of measure and communication-resemblance is produced on a curve (262).

Reversing Platonism means to make simulacra affirm their rights among icons and copies.

Simulacrum's positive power—2 inclusive divergent series of the simulacrum. Resemblance makes the series resonate.

Simulacrum as machinery—Dionysian machines. Power of the false (phantasm). Nomadic distribution and the unground as a joyful, positive event (263).

Simulation designates the power of producing an effect (263). Hence ontological and simulated sense.

Simulation and eternal return—distinguish from Platonic return.

Zarathustra's refusals of the dwarf and the animals.

Chaodysey (chao-errance).

Only a simulated Same and Similar.

Eternal Return is still selective—it makes the extremes return and denies the mediocre, the mediated, the negative.

Developing an untimely philosophy—three times—distant past, present, future—(reversal of Platonism, critical modern edge of the simulacra, future and the phantasm as belief in the eternal return).

Artificial vs. simulacrum and the two modes of destruction/nihilism.

Logic of Sense: Series 2 on the Paradox of Surface Effects: Dialectics as the Art of Conjugation

In series 2 on the paradox of surface effects, Deleuze happens to mention dialectics as “the art of conjugation” (8). Before diving into the implications of this statement, we should note that for Deleuze, the pure event can be conceived of as an infinitive independent of any temporal, modal, vocal or personal grammatical determinations—and so in essence, this type of pure event can be conceived of properly as a pre-individual singularity that escapes the logical ordering of worlds (214). This insistence on the link between the infinitive and the event can be traced throughout the book and culminates in series 30 on the phantasm; however, we can understand how and for what purpose Deleuze chooses to designate a role for dialectics (note, not *the* dialectic) in his philosophy. All that is required is a more concrete definition of dialectics as Deleuze gives it and an unpacking of what the art of conjugation entails for an understanding of the way in which events come to be expressed in propositions and the way that these events are themselves related in propositions (8).

I did not happen to bring up series 30 on accident, for what Deleuze makes explicit is that psychoanalysis and dialectics, fundamentally at least, share a strong affinity (notice Deleuze chiding Freud for taking a ‘Hegelian’ position on the contradictory nature of primitive words) (213). This is because psychoanalysis takes phantasms as the (im)material for its science of events. Similarly, Deleuze links the incorporeal effects or “dialectical attributes” to the events that populate the surface (5). In fact, Deleuze will even say “The Stoics discovered surface effects. Simulacra cease to be subterranean rebels and make the most of their effects (that is, what might be called ‘phantasms,’ independently of the Stoic terminology)” (8). It is here that Deleuze first equates the event with being beyond the passive/active opposition, being both and neither at once (8).

If dialectics is “the science of incorporeal events as they are expressed in propositions, and of the connections between events as they are expressed in relation between propositions,” then one might well question whether or not Deleuze fully bypasses this sort of static conception of events (8). In fact, I want to hypothesize that Deleuze brings up dialectics at the start as a one-sided approach to the phenomenon of language formation along a frontier. What will become important to Deleuze is not simply how the infinitive-event is conjugated in a world, but instead how infinitive-events can be said to be a-cosmic

and singular. This singularity can be tricky if we choose to see events circulating in a univocal Event that is transcendent to the world and its logic. If we choose to see the ideality of the pure event as transcendent, we fall into the easy trap that Badiou is guilty of—namely, that of condemning the concept of the virtual as that which introduces transcendence into an otherwise untainted, univocal system of immanence.

But this does not answer the obvious question—what does the virtual mean and how does it correlate with Deleuze’s concept of dialectics? If we can roughly divide the terms actual/virtual with the two movements of time Chronos/Aion, then we may be able to make some progress (or make things more confusing). As I understand it, Chronos is the time of the pure, full present, the past and the future being subsumed and contracted or folded into one layer. But Aion works exactly opposite: instead, future and past are infinitely subdivided and the present is what is empty—in this sense, the present is not, or it can be considered a void point. If we can imagine that the world partakes of both times at once, we belie the fundamental point—events that are temporalized have actual consequences on the world of Chronos. Instead of being just past or just about to come—as Deleuze understands the time of Aion and the pure event—actualized events come to share in the consequences of world formation and logical development. But this leaves the obvious question of the virtuality of the event: what about an event that isn’t actualized? We can say that the event did not take place because of a lack of force or because of a sufficient intensity for a zone was not activated. In other words, events have *potentials* that must be tapped into and unleashed for a proportionate actualization. In some sense, the event requires certain conditions and the relative critical energy in order for the chaos of the virtual to be actualized in the production of reality. It is, then, the duty of dialectics to be able to formulate specific conditions that augment the conjugation of pure events from the virtuality of Aion to the actuality of Chronos.

Series 17: Static Logical Genesis: Metaphysical Surface

The most intriguing concept in this series seems to be what Deleuze calls the metaphysical surface or the transcendental field. I want to hypothesize that the “transcendental” in this concept signifies the possibility of language. This has something to do not only with Deleuze’s insistence on a frontier of language, but also resonates strongly with his focus on what he calls folding or enveloping. I will try to illuminate the complexity behind these concepts and show how they all interpenetrate one another in order to constitute the metaphysical surface that makes language possible.

The ontological proposition deals with individuals and persons, the former being infinite analytically and the latter being finite synthetically. These two ground one another and allow for denotation (the realm of the infinite analytic) and manifestation (related to the finite synthetic nature of the person) to enter into language. Signification is defined by possibility, and takes the place of the logical proposition. Deleuze is unable to say whether signification is primary at the start because “signification presupposes . . . an entire play of denotation and manifestation both in the power to affirm premises and in the power to state conclusions” (119). Thus, signification actually presupposes the formation of a good and common sense, linked to the individual and the person respectively. The tertiary structure of the proposition is “contingent upon sense” because it is formed by ontological and logical geneses (119). There is a secondary organization of sense (good and common) that allows for Deleuze to talk about the two *x*’s: on the one hand we have the object without a place, that which always exceeds its boundaries, and on the other hand we have the empty square, that which serves as the empty form of identity that common sense produces. Deleuze explains that there is, beyond the tertiary order of the proposition and

the secondary organization of sense, “a terrible primary order wherein the entire language becomes enfolded” (120).

This folding is where we start to deal with the surface of language, and Deleuze asks a key question before introducing the transcendental field: “How can we maintain both that sense produces even the states of affairs in which it is embodied, and that it is itself produced by these states of affairs or the actions and passions of bodies?” (124). His answer is that it resides in the depths of the pulsation of mixed bodies, “by means of its power to organize surfaces and to envelop itself within the surface” (124). This is why Deleuze will say that “The surface is neither active nor passive, it is the product of the actions and passions of mixed bodies” (124). Making an analogy with physical surfaces, Deleuze argues that there is a surface energy which, without being *of* the surface is attributed *to* surface formations. Thus with a physics of surfaces there arises a metaphysics of surfaces as well: it is this metaphysical surface which will act as the name for “the frontier established, on one hand, between bodies taken together as a whole and inside the limits which envelop them, and on the other, propositions in general” (125). This surface, then, is linked to a “sonorous *continuum*” which insures that speech sticks to the extra-Being of bodies in such a way to envelop them in the interiority of language—allowing for a frontier of sound (proposition) and substance (bodies).

The last thing to emphasize is that this metaphysical surface which acts as a frontier is not one that separates—and so, this is not a limit in the Hegelian sense. It’s a limit which is not one, a porous limit, a membrane as such. This membrane is actually the articulation of sense as that which happens to bodies and insists in propositions (125). It is also not a separation in the way that sense is doubled up at the surface and deployed on both sides of the frontier. It is when this frontier is abolished that sense irrupts into nonsense and bodies fall back into their depths, unable to signify or have sense. As Deleuze argues at the end of the series, as long as the surface lasts, sense will bring about individuation in bodies and signification in propositions, allowing for the true event of language to unfold.

–Taylor Adkins

[Logic of Sense: Series 25](#)

Of course, with Series 25, one could, along with Badiou, single out the title as the concept that needs to be unpacked, especially since univocity has a particularly Deleuzian ring to it. But the term—and Deleuze starts using it around p. 150 in the text—that most interests me in this series is *counter-actualization*.

On the one hand, we can remember the play of the virtual/actual couple that Badiou finds so fun to dismantle. On the other, the most important thing is to signify how this term works in this particularly situated part of the text. So, giving Deleuze the benefit of the doubt, we should keep in mind that Deleuze doesn’t use the word *virtual* anywhere in this passage. Neither does he use the word *compossible* in this passage, but since he has introduced this term with reference to Leibniz, I think it’s important to stress a point that Deleuze makes at the beginning of the series: there is no such thing as incompatibility between events because such a term can only be used when referring to worlds, individuals, or persons (177). Since the disjunctive synthesis is the basis for the affirmation of the divergent, worlds that actualize events can become incompatible because of the divergent singularities

that populate their series; strictly speaking though, “it seems that all events, even contraries, are compatible” (177).

So, simply put, Deleuze’s question is: how is the individual able to “transcend his form and his syntactical link with a world” in order to “attain the universal communication of events” (178). But this is not so simple. Here Deleuze seems to mean the following: if, as quoted above, all events are compatible, then how is any language of the event possible? Before following Deleuze’s argument more closely, we should bring Leibniz back to the center of discussion. Deleuze draws on and explicates Leibniz’s theory of monads through *The Logic of Sense*, and so it would not be inappropriate here to talk about his theory of monads: all monads “perceive” the world from a distinct perspective and also link up with other monads, causing permutations in the vicinity as they link up—Deleuze continues this discussion in *Difference and Repetition* in order to explain the ways in which the monads express a differential relation between themselves (47). So, in themselves, monads contain a grain of truth about the world which they inhabit. Each monad must be considered in itself, a part which has a reciprocal relationship with other parts, like a link in a signifying chain, and thus a world is constructed from this double action.

Yet, as Deleuze points out, with the event we cannot refer to a grammar of worlds. Syntactically, the event seems both to insist on its *extra-being* and also entail a pre-individuality that lacks any true communicability. That’s unless we can bring about counter-actualization. In the sense that I understand it, counter-actualization comes about when an individual considers herself as an event and that event as “another individual grafted onto her” (178). This double affirmation extends to treating other individuals as events and their events as individuals—it is this affirmation that brings events “to the power of the eternal return” (178). The power of the eternal return is what allows for an affirmation of the disjunctive synthesis; in other words, the divergence of two series (individuals with respect to the distance of other individuals/events) is not only affirmative *but it necessarily alters the other series by resonating in it and vice versa*. It is the conjunction of Leibnizian monads and counter-actualization that allows for Deleuze to talk of a unique Event. It is this unique Event that the univocity of Being is: “if Being is the unique event in which all events communicate with one another, univocity refers both to what occurs and to what is said” (180).

–Taylor Adkins